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.essential ingredient of this crime and therefore proof that defendant authorized
the operator to drive his car, without more, will not suffice.
Tt'e dissent took issue with the majority on the ground that the legislative
intent would be undermined by placing such a burden on the prosecution since
the aim of the statute is to impose criminal responsibility upon the owner
whenever an unlicensed person operates the motor vehicle with the authorization
of the owner. It argued that the mvjority, in holding it incumbent upon the
People to establish that the owner knew the person he had perm-*tted to operate
his motor vehicle was unlicensed, attributed to the legislature the enactment of a
self-defeating measure.
In the light of traditional interpretation of penal statutes, the majority's
position seems a sound and reasonable expression of the common law maxim that
mens rea is an essential ingredient of a crime.' 08 Unless the legislature expressly
109
provides otherwise, the burden of proof of such intent is on the prosecution.
So-called public welfare offenses have been held punishable without regard to any
mental element, but these have been offenses of a merely regulatory nature,
involving monetary fines rather than imprisonment. 110
Validity of Plea Made on Sunday
Section 5 of the Judiciary Law prohibits, with certain exceptions, the
transacting of any business by the courts on Sunday. The exception upon which the
Reedy"' turned was added by amendment in 1930 and reads:
case of People v,.
"except ...for the receipt by a court of special sessions of a plea of guilty and the
pronouncement of a sentence thereon in any case in which such court has
jurisdiction."
The defendant was arrested on Saturday for driving while intoxicated and
was brought before the court the following day when he pled guilty to the charge
and was fined. On appeal, the Court rejected the contention that section 5 had
been violated. The facts came within the express language of the exception.
Absence of Exit Speed Signs Not Fatal to Conviction for Speeding Where
Reasonable Notice of Speed Limit Given - Per Curiam
A village ordinance proscribed traffic within the village at a speed greater
than twenty-five miles per hour, imposed a fine for violation of the ordinance, and
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further provided that violators could be prosecuted as disorderly persons. Held:
the defendant charged with violation was validly convicted. The fact that end of
speed zone signs were not up was not material since fair notice was given as to
what the limit was within the village. Whether or not the "disorderly persons"
portion of the ordinance was valid, defendant was not prosecuted thereunder and
12
this provision was severable; hence, defendant could not complain.'
Personal Summation By Defendant Not Allowed When Represented By Attorney
In People v. Richardson,"13 the defendant sought a reversal of a first degree
murder conviction upon the ground that although represented by counsel, he had
an absolute right to personally sum up to the jury. The Court held that no such
right existed. The Court equated the constitutional right that an accused "shall
11 4
be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions"
to that right given a party in a civil suit. In a civil suit, a party has a right to
appear personally but if the party has an attorney his participation will be
allowed only at the discretion of the court." 5 The Court, in the Richardson case
found no abuse of the trial court's discretion in disallowing the defendant's
participation and accordingly affirmed the judgment for conviction. To take a
defendant's privilege to interfere out of the trial court's discretion would be
disruptive of orderly court procedure and the proper administration of justice."
Right to Counsel

-

Burden of Proof of Deprivation

In People v. Prior,1 17 the defendant was convicted and fined in a Police

Justice Court upon a plea of guilty to driving while intoxicated.1 8 On appeal t'o
County Court, the defendant stated in his affidavit of errors that "he did not have
the benefit of counsel" and alleged generally that "he was not fully advised of his
rights in the situation."
The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's allegation of "not having
benefit of counsel" did not constitute matter to which the Police Justice need
respond in his return."19 An allegation of "not having opportunity to secure
counsel," however, would suggest that benefit of counsel was not waived' 20 bur
deprived, thus requiring a specific response in the return of the police justice.
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